In recent days, there has been a considerable amount of discourse on the issue of who won and how many people were killed as a result of the war in South Ossetia. The discussion smacks of cynicism. A huge tragedy has occurred – for the Ossetians, Georgians and Russians. Thousands have been killed. It seems that the impossible has happened – war between two fraternal nations. What exactly happened?
The problem of South Ossetia
I personally encountered the situation in South Ossetia back in 1990 while I was working in President Mikhail Gorbachev’s administration. The Ossetians are a divided people, with most of them living in the republic of North Ossetia on the Russian side of the border. In South Ossetia, which at that time was part of the Georgian Soviet Republic, there were approximately 160,000 Ossetians. Like many other peoples living within the Soviet Union, the South Ossetians proclaimed their independence. In their case, they were declaring their independence from Georgia, whose borders were established by none other than the famous Georgian himself – Josef Stalin. Georgia’s refusal to recognize the Ossetians’ independence was viewed by the latter as extremely unjust. Moreover, Georgia eliminated their autonomy (even today it still has not been restored) and placed its troops in South Ossetia. The resulting war lasted for more than two years. Thousands of people died, and tens of thousands became refugees. The number of Ossetians in Georgia decreased by half – to 80,000. The war ended with a peace settlement in Dagomys, which mandated a regional peacekeeping force made up of Russians, South Ossetians and Georgians.
Since 1992, South Ossetia has lived outside the realm of Georgian statehood. Tbilisi has not spent a penny on pensions, salaries, or other such expenses in the region. Residents of South Ossetia have not even had passports. Georgia did not give them, although the Ossetians would not have accepted them. Many Ossetians carry Russian passports. People cannot live without passports, and no others were available. There was one battalion of peacekeepers from Russia – approximately 500 people with light weapons (fewer than Western, especially American, military specialists in the Georgian army). Over the past 15 years, despite unceasing provocation, the peacekeeping force managed to deter the repetition of a larger war. In recent weeks, there was an obvious aggravation of the situation, which forced Moscow to issue several strong warnings to Tbilisi.
On August 7-8, at midnight, Georgian troops launched a strong offensive against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and against villages in the southern part of the unrecognized republic in order to restore “constitutional order and Georgia’s territorial integrity.” During the first 14 hours, prior to the entry of the Russian army’s 58th division, a carpet of rocket and artillery fire completely destroyed Tskhinvali and ten Ossetian villages. Civilian casualties exceeded 1,500, and a stream of refugees ensued. In the early hours of the onset, 12 Russian peacekeepers were killed and 70 were wounded. Russia demanded that the UN Security Council convene immediately, although the latter was only willing to discuss the issue. Given that the Georgian army, along its forward echelon of reservists, exceeded the entire population of South Ossetia, who were threatened by genocide, President Dmitry Medvedev ordered Russian troops to enter.
Saakashvili’s logic
In Moscow, people often ask whether Saakashvili was crazy to provoke a military confrontation with Russia. Of course, there is always the temptation to explain everything through the framework of the diabolical Georgian leader’s inadequacies, even more so because there are grounds to believe this. All the first-hand information that I have heard suggests that Saakashvili really did think that the Georgian military was strong enough, well armed enough and sufficiently trained to quickly win should a conflict with Russia break out. After all, how well was Moscow able to cope with much weaker Chechen formations in the 1990s?
There is no doubt that Saakashvili and his friends were moved by the idea that a small and victorious war could lead to a political resuscitation for the Georgian president. Recently, his credibility had fallen everywhere. In Georgia, the opposition was not without reason in saying that only at the cost of large-scale falsifications was Saakashvili able to win in the first round of the presidential elections. Since the fall of 2007 in Europe and even in the United States, Saakashvili’s use of force to disperse opposition protests, arrest and exile of opponents and the suppression of independent media have caused growing frustration. Washington even began looking for his replacement, often seeing Nino Burjanadze as a possible new leader.
Given the degree of the Georgian regime’s dependency, it is difficult to assume that Saakashvili was alone in deciding to launch a military operation. An indirect confirmation of this is the absolute silence of the Anglo-American media during the initial phase of the military campaign. The silence persisted up until the appearance of Russian soldiers. Since foreign advisers are involved in Georgia’s military planning, it is unlikely that they knew nothing about the operation in advance.
Were the strategies and tactics employed by the Georgians that inadequate? No. Had the Russian troops not been involved, in all likelihood the Ossetian problem would have been solved – owing to the lack of Ossetians. Had they entered quickly enough, Georgian troops could have sealed off the Roksky tunnel – the only artery linking South Ossetia with the North. Such a move could indeed have resulted in military victory. Since Russia intervened in time, it has been accused of aggression and Saakashvili turns out to be the victim. Georgia’s military defeat, which did in fact happen, has actually been viewed as a success by many hawks in Tbilisi. Another 30,000 refugees left South Ossetia, and many of these may never return to their homeland. The number of Ossetians has thus fallen to 50,000. Standard ethnic cleansing.
Medvedev’s logic
This was not our war. Russia had no interest in fighting it for any reason other than out of concern for humanitarian issues. There was no advanced preparation; otherwise, the troops would have been brought closer to Ossetia. The first bomber, which arrived after 14 hours and was shot down by Georgia’s air defense, came from Orenburg!
Did Medvedev have a choice? In my opinion, he did not. Not introducing troops would have created the impression of a leader who was unable to protect the lives of thousands of its citizens and soldiers. A country that can be so freely attacked with impunity will find the war on its own territory next time. Entering Georgia came with all the costs that we are now seeing, including more complicated relations with the West. But turning a blind eye to genocide in South Ossetia is not a price that Russia is prepared for unclouded relations with anyone, especially since these relations were never that cloudless to begin with.
A decision was made to launch a military operation in order to secure peace, as provided for in the peacekeeping mandate. As a law professor, Medvedev paid great attention to the legality of his actions.
The military operation
Russia’s military operation should be regarded as a great success. Speculation on the ineffectiveness of Russia’s armed forced turned out to be highly exaggerated. With all the inevitable costs and casualties, after just two or three days a first-class army, trained by the Americans, suffered defeat. According to a number of parameters, Georgian forces were superior to Russia’s (e.g., number of soldiers in the zone of fighting, equipment, communications and night vision devices). The operation’s success was assured by the speed of the invasion, air dominance established after the suppression of radar surveillance, successful actions in specific mountain areas (Chechen special forces battalions acted with exceptional professionalism here), and the rapid disorganization of Georgia’s logistical structure and control systems. Russia’s armed forces lost 75 people. About 1,600 Ossetian civilians were killed. Georgia, however, has said that total military and civilian losses stand at approximately 170 people.
Military victory has led many in Moscow, not without justification, to believe that Russia is in a position to dictate the terms of peace, something which is naturally not accepted by Georgia and its foreign allies who are prone to accuse Russia of aggression.
Consequences for Georgia
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said that Saakashvili’s actions had struck a mortal blow to the territorial integrity of Georgia. It is difficult not to agree with this assessment. Whereas before the war there were a few Ossetians and Abkhaz who were not opposed to living as part of Georgia, their minds have now clearly been changed. I would not wait for an immediate unilateral recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, however. Medvedev is a true legalist, and Russia’s political gain from such recognition is questionable. As a result of the war, this issue has made its way onto the global political agenda simply to keep Western politicians silent on the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity.
The images of President Saakashvili running for cover that circulated around the globe, with journalists quietly standing by, will have major consequences for the Caucasus in the sense that Saakashvili will no longer be perceived as a real man, which in that part of the world is a death sentence for any politician.
In the face of widespread international sympathy for Georgia, Saakashvili’s political stature has diminished in terms of his relations with the rest of the world. For Russia he is a war criminal that any official refuses to speak with. Saakashvili, who a year ago was an absolute favorite in the West, now has much less passionate admirers, and his fan club is now restricted to part of the Washington establishment and to those leaders (the Baltic countries, Poland and Ukraine) who were present at the concert in Tbilisi to celebration “Georgia’s victory.” In Europe, they don’t like it when the little guy gets picked on. They didn’t like seeing Russia pick on Georgia. But they didn’t like seeing Saakashvili picking on the Ossetians. In Europe, at least they know who started the conflict.
The geopolitical context
The essence of the post-Soviet era is that the West, exemplified by the United States, filled the geopolitical vacuum that had formed. Russia, which was perceived as a defeated power, never had its interests taken into account when issues came up concerning regime change on its periphery, NATO expansion or the violation of arms control agreements. Russia resisted verbally, although ultimately it did so unsuccessfully. It began to be perceived as a country that was able to protest but was largely powerless otherwise.
The war in South Ossetia, Russia’s first military campaign outside its territory since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, is an obvious milestone in geopolitical terms. It shows that the vacuum has been filled. Further expansion of Western influence is now possible only in those areas that Russia sees as zones of existential challenge that the country cannot ignore or leave unanswered.
Obviously, the implications in terms of our relations with the West are very bad – tough policy statements, the threat of sanctions and a loathsome press. It is important, however, to assess the extent of deteriorated relations and their sustainability.
To me it is clear that the current crisis has forced Russia to reckon with itself more than at any other time in the post-Soviet era. Maybe it has happened for the very first time. Medvedev’s proposals were based on six articles that were supported both by parties to the conflict, as well as by the West. No one, not even the most hawkish politicians in Washington, has expressed interest in direct confrontation with Russia.
In general, the West understands that cooperation with Russia is important, if not absolutely necessary, when it comes to dealing with such issues as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, the Middle East, nonproliferation or combating international terrorism. All of these problems are just as important as the Georgian issue.
How will the war affect the prospects of Georgia and Ukraine for entering NATO? I think the answer to that question is ambiguous. Some, like Senator John McCain in the United States and a number of politicians in eastern Europe, see the war as an argument for these countries’ unconditional membership. For old Europe, the war is likely viewed as an argument against membership, for Saakashvili is seen as someone who will draw everyone into a conflict. Indeed, had Georgia already been a member of NATO, the alliance would have been obliged to fight with the Russian “aggressor.” Given that acceptance into NATO requires the consensus of all members, the issue of expanding it further is likely to be tabled for the time being.
Modern Russia is a typical status quo power that is not interested in destabilization, especially in its border regions. On the contrary, it strives for calm in the region and throughout the world. The Program 2020, which was initiated by Putin and continues to be developed by Medvedev, does not include a military component. On the contrary, it has repeatedly been stated that Russia needs several years of peaceful, steady development to become a first-rate power. It seems that these years will not simply be given to us. Russia’s success in expanding its economic and financial opportunities is too obvious for the country to be left alone.
All wars end in peace, and the sooner peace happens, the better. Peace has almost arrived, although “almost” is the key word. Georgia and its unrecognized autonomous regions promise to remain a destabilizing factor in the Caucasus and in our relations with the West. It is a factor that can be kept current when the global puppeteers need it to be. Ukraine is also being turned into a destabilizing factor, which means that calm was only a dream to us when we were quietly developing our country. Welcome to the new reality.
